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	<title>Verifying the origin of the request received by a resource server - comments</title>
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The transmission of tokens to protected resources implies that the latters are receptive to tokens of any origin. This presents an opportunity for an attacker (a foreign application) to exploit a compromised or stolen token. Once more, the analysis reveals that we are only able to ensure data security in the case of the &#034;Authorization Code&#034; flow. Consideration about the security of token transmission to resource servers (RS) The proposed RFC 6749 standard is quite clear on the need to (&#8230;)
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